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Pursuant to Rule 24(c), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, 
appellant Farmers New World Life Insurance Company ("Farmers") 
respectfully submits the following brief in reply to the brief of 
respondent Bountiful City ("the City"). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Farmer disputes the City's characterization of certain facts 
of record, as follows: 
1. The City lists the damages alleged by Farmers as loss 
of income, diminution of value, costs of repair, and reclamation 
of vegetation. (Respondent's brief at 5. ) The City omits from 
the list, however, the additional allegation that certain 
portions of the mall were rendered uninhabitable by the injuries 
to the mall. (R. 22, 423; Add. 22, 83.) 
SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENTS 
1. A qualified-immunity interpretation of § 63-30-3, para. 
2, is reasonable and does not render the immunity language of 
that paragraph meaningless. On the other hand, an absolute-
immunity interpretation violates article I, § 24 because it 
arbitrarily denies persons injured by flood control construction 
the right to sue, while persons injured by other types of water 
management construction are allowed the right to sue. 
The correct standard of scrutiny to apply in this case is 
the standard articulated by this Court in Malan v. Lewis, 693 
P.2d 661 (Utah 1984), not the rational basis test. Like Malan, 
this case involves the right to sue under the open courts clause 
of the Utah Constitution, article I, § 11, because at common law 
cities were liable for negligent construction of long-term flood 
control improvements. Such construction is not a governmental 
function nor is it an exercise of police power. Thus, it is 
entirely different than emergency flood control. Since the 
objective of § 63-30-3, para. 2, is to protect police power flood 
control efforts, granting immunity for non-emergency flood 
control construction does not reasonably or substantially further 
the statutory objective. 
2. The enactment of § 63-30-10.5, which waives immunity 
for takings or damagings, in no way obviates the need for this 
Court to overrule Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 354 P.2d 105 
(Utah 1960). The constitutional waiver of immunity found in 
article I, § 22 is independent of and broader than the waiver of 
immunity found in § 63-30-10.5 
The right to compensation under article I, § 22 extends to 
non-intentional damagings. To the extent that Lund v. Salt Lake 
County, 200 P. 510 (Utah 1921), is to the contrary, it should be 
overruled as violating modern case law and the policy underlying 
article I, § 22. The requirement in article I, § 22, that 
property must be damaged "for public use" means that the damage 
must result from construction of a public improvement, and in no 
way requires a retention of the Lund rule. 
3. The determination of when a taking has occurred is 
essentially a factual determination. Farmers has adequately 
pleaded a taking under the Fifth Amendment by alleging that the 
damage to the mall rendered certain portions uninhabitable. Such 
allegations satisfy the requirements for alleging a taking set 
2 
forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104 (1978). 
4. Farmers is also entitled to sue based on the implied 
contract created by its easement with the City. The City 
manifested its assent to such a contract by taking delivery of 
the instrument creating the easement. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I: The Flood Control Amendment to § 63-30-3 Creates Only 
Qualified Immunity for Flood Control Construction 
A, The Flood Control Amendment Is Not Rendered "Meaning-
less" by a Qualified-Immunity Interpretation 
The flood-control immunity created in paragraph two of § 63-
30-3 should be interpreted as being subject to the same 
exceptions as the governmental-function immunity defined in 
paragraph one of § 63-30-3. Under such a "qualified-immunity" 
interpretation, Farmers is entitled to sue under § 63-30-9, which 
waives immunity for injuries caused by a dangerous or defective 
condition of a public improvement. See Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 
1117, 1120 (Utah 1975) (§ 63-30-9 applies to damages caused by 
construction of a public improvement). Moreover, Farmers is also 
entitled to sue under § 63-30-10, which waives immunity for 
injuries caused by negligence of an employee. 
The City argues that the phrase "governmental entities . . . 
are immune from suit" in paragraph two is meaningless unless it 
is interpreted to create absolute, unqualified immunity for all 
flood control acts. A qualified-immunity interpretation does not 
render the phrase meaningless, however, because the phrase 
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contains the additional language, not found in paragraph one of § 
63-30-3, that "governmental entities and their officers and 
employees are immune from suit." (Emphasis added.) This 
additional language expands the scope of immunity under paragraph 
two to include officers and employees of governmental entities, 
unlike paragraph one. Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978) 
(immunity under paragraph one does not include employees); 
Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925 (Utah 1977) (same). Therefore, 
a qualified-immunity interpretation does not render the phrase 
meaningless. 
B. If § 63-30-3 Creates Absolute Liability for Non-
Emergency Flood Control Construction, Then the Statute 
Violates Equal Protection 
The City argues that an absolute-immunity interpretation of 
§ 63-30-3, para. 2, does not violate the equal protection clause 
of the Utah Constitution, article I, § 24, as articulated by this 
Court in Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984). The City 
gives three reasons for its argument: (1) Farmers has no right 
to a remedy under the open courts clause, Utah Constitution, 
article I, § 11, and therefore the Malan v. Lewis standard does 
not apply here; (2) the proper standard to apply is the 
traditional rational basis test articulated by federal equal 
protection cases; and (3) when a rational basis standard is 
applied, an absolute-immunity interpretation of § 63-30-3, para. 
2 does not violate equal protection. 
Before addressing these arguments directly, it is important 
to restate the Malan standard, in reply to the City's criticism 
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that it is "vaguely defined" by Farmers. The Malan standard can 
be best understood by contrasting it with traditional federal 
equal protection analysis. Under this analysis, a legislative 
classification ordinarily will be upheld if there is any 
conceivable rational basis for the classification, and if there 
is any conceivable, rational relationship between the 
classification and a legitimate statutory objective. This 
analysis, which is often referred to as the "rational basis" 
test, affords almost total deference to statutory classifications 
unless they are "suspect" or affect fundamental rights. 
Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 354 (Utah 1989). 
In Malan this Court refused to be bound by the traditional 
federal equal protection analysis in interpreting Utah's own 
"equal protection" clause, article I, § 24. The standard 
articulated in Malan does not afford total deference to statutory 
classifications, especially when such classifications diminish a 
constitutional (but not necessarily a "fundamental") right, such 
as the right to seek a remedy under article I, § 11 of the Utah 
Constitution. Mountain Fuel Supply, Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
752 P.2d 884, 889-90 (Utah 1988); Malan, 693 P.2d at 674 n.17. 
In such instances, the statutory classifications must be 
reasonable and must in fact reasonably and substantially further 
the legislative purpose of the statute. Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 
355, 373; Mountain Fuel Supply, 752 P.2d at 890; Malan, 693 P.2d 
at 670. The determination of reasonableness takes into account 
the degree to which the statute unreasonably burdens the 
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constitutional right. See Malan, 693 P.2d at 674 n.17; 
Condemarin, 775 P. 2d at 354, 373. In short, the Malan standard 
requires a "real and thoughtful examination" of the 
classification and the relationship between the classification 
and the legislative purpose. Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 356. 
1. Farmers Does Have a Right under the Open Courts Clause, 
and Therefore the Malan Standard Applies. 
The City does not deny that if Farmers has a right to a 
remedy against the City under the open courts clause of the Utah 
Constitution, article I, § 11, then the Malan standard applies to 
this case. The City argues, however, that Farmers has no such 
right because at common-law Farmers had no right to sue a city 
for improper construction of a flood control system. See Berry 
ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) 
(article I, § 11 protects common-law causes of action). This 
argument is based on the proposition that at common law cities 
were immune from liability for damages resulting from the 
exercise of a governmental function, and upon the unsupported 
assertion that non-emergency flood control construction is the 
exercise of a governmental function. (Respondent's brief at 10-
13. ) 
Farmers disagrees that the determination of whether it has a 
right under article I, § 11, depends solely on Farmers' rights at 
common law. See Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 
P.2d 670, 676 n.3 (Utah 1985) (common law only measures "to an 
extent" rights under article I, §11). Nevertheless, even at 
common law cities were liable for improper or negligent 
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construction of flood control improvements. 52A C.J.S. Levees & 
Flood Control, § 12(b) (1968). For example, in Jordan v. City of 
Mt. Pleasant, 15 Utah 449, 49 P. 746 (1897), this Court held the 
city of Mount Pleasant liable for damages caused by its negligent 
construction of a long-term flood control system. The Court 
reasoned that in constructing such an improvement, the city had 
the duty "to use all reasonable means and precautions not to 
cause the destruction of or injury to private property." Id. 
See also Levy v. Salt Lake City, 3 Utah 63, 1 P. 160, 162 (1881) 
("a public work, authorized by law, must be executed in a 
reasonably proper and skillful manner"). 
Although Jordan v. City of Mt. Pleasant, supra, did not 
expressly decide whether non-emergency flood control construction 
was a governmental function entitling cities to immunity, the 
implication of its holding is that such construction is not a 
governmental function. A number of courts have expressly held 
this to be so. Denver v. Talarico, 99 Colo. 178, 61 P.2d 1 
(1936); Denver v. Stutzman, 95 Colo. 165, 33 P.2d 1071 (1934); 
Boise Development Co. v. Boise City, 30 Idaho 675, 167 P. 1032 
(1917); Wilson v. Boise City, 6 Idaho 391, 55 P. 887 (1899); 
Krantz v. City of Hutchinson, 165 Kan. 449, 196 P.2d 227 (1948); 
E. B. Metal & Rubber Industries, Inc. v. Washington County, 102 
A.D. 2d 599, 479 N.Y.S. 2d 794 (1984); Ordway v. Caniesteo, 66 
7 
Hun. 569, 21 N.Y.S. 835 (1893); Barden v. Portage, 79 Wis. 126, 
48 N.W. 210 (1891).1 
The foregoing cases are consistent with this Court's 
definition of "governmental function." In Thomas v. Clearfield 
City, 642 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982), this Court held the maintenance 
of sanitary sewers to not be a governmental function because 
sewage disposal was not of such a unique character that it can 
only be performed by a governmental agency, or that it was an 
activity that "government alone must do." Id. at 739, quoting 
Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d 432, 434 (Utah 1981). 
The Court pointed to the fact that private individuals may and 
often do undertake such activities, and that no statute requires 
municipalities to engage in such activities. Id. 
The same rationale applies to non-emergency flood control 
construction. It is not an activity of such a unique character 
that it can only be performed by the government, and is not an 
activity that government alone must do. Certainly private 
individuals may and often do undertake the construction of 
private flood and water control projects. See, e.g., Burton v. 
1
 Similarly, the construction, maintenance, and operation of 
sanitary and storm sewers have been held to not be governmental 
functions. See Dalton v. Salt Lake Sub. Sanitary District, 676 
P.2d 399 (Utah 1984) (sanitary sewer); Thomas v. Clearfield City, 
642 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982) (sanitary sewer); Slemp v. City of North 
Miami, 545 So.2d 256 (Fla. 1989) (storm sewer); Elledge v. City 
of Pes Moines, 144 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa 1966) (storm sewer); St. 
Joseph Light & Power Co. v. Kaw Valley Tunneling, Inc., 589 
S.W.2d 260 (Mo. 1979) (storm sewer); Accurate Die Casting Co. v. 
City of Cleveland, 442 N.E.2d 459 (Ohio App. 1981) (storm sewer); 
City of Round Rock v. Smith, 687 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. 1985) (storm 
sewer); City of Watauga v. Taylor, 752 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. App. 
1988) (storm sewer). 
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Celentano, 658 P.2d 247 (Ariz. App. 1982). Furthermore, although 
cities are empowered to control watercourses and construct 
drainage and sewage systems, they are not charged with the 
responsibility to protect the public from flooding, as are 
counties and the state. Compare U.C.A., 1953, §§ 10-8-16 & -38 
(giving cities power to regulate watercourses and construct 
drainage and sewage facilities) with U.C.A., 1953, §§ 17-8-5 & 
73-2-22 (giving counties and state power to deal with floods and 
construct flood control). 
In sum, pursuant to Jordan v. City of Mt. Pleasant, supra, 
Farmers had the right at common law to sue the City for negligent 
flood control construction. Moreover, non-emergency flood 
control construction is not an activity so essential or uniquely 
governmental that it should immunize cities from liability for 
failing to take proper precautions in such construction. 
Accordingly, Farmers has the constitutional right to sue under 
article I, § 22, and the Ma Ian standard should apply to this 
case.2 
The cases cited by the City are not to the contrary. 
Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 626 (1913), is 
distinguishable because in that case the defendant was the state 
board of land commissioners, which unlike a municipal corporation 
2
 The City also argues that Farmers has no right under 
article I, § 11, and therefore the Malan standard does not apply, 
because Farmers has an alternative remedy against the other 
defendants in this case. However, whether Farmers can prevail 
against any of these defendants, and to what proportion their 
comparative negligence may be, is a question of fact that cannot 
be decided on summary judgment. 
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is solely a creature of the state and therefore at common law was 
presumed to always act in a governmental capacity. Bingham v. 
Board of Education, 223 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1950) (explaining 
difference, for purposes of tort liability, between municipal 
corporations and quasi-municipal corporations). Furthermore, in 
Wilkinson there were no allegations of negligence, without which 
there could be no liability. 
In McKell v. Spanish Fork City, 6 Utah 2d 92, 305 P.2d 1097 
(Utah 1957), also cited by the City, the cityfs non-liability was 
based not on sovereign immunity, but rather on the "common enemy" 
doctrine, which allows riparian landowners to take whatever 
precautions may be necessary in response to extraordinary 
flooding to prevent damage, even if lower riparian landowners are 
damaged. McKell expressly declined to address the issue of 
sovereign immunity. 305 P.2d at 1100. 
2. The Rational Basis Standard Does Not Apply. 
In light of the foregoing section, the rational basis test 
simply can not apply to this case. To do so would violate this 
Court's unanimous decision in Malan v. Lewis. The Utah cases 
cited by the City in which a rational basis standard was applied 
all pre-date Malan. 
The City claims that an "overwhelming majority" of other 
courts apply the rational basis standard in sovereign immunity 
cases. The better-reasoned cases, however, hold that where the 
state waives, even partially, its sovereign immunity, any 
classifications made in reference thereto must be reasonable. 
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E.g., Jenkins v. State, 85 Wash. 2d 883, 540 P.2d 1363 (1975). 
In such a situation, courts have held various sovereign immunity 
statutes unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. Greyhound 
Food Management, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 653 F. Supp. 1207 (S.D. 
Ohio 1986), aff'd 852 F.2d 866 (6th Cir. 1988); Bernthal v. City 
of St. Paul, 376 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1985); Jenkins v. State, 85 
Wash. 2d 883, 540 P.2d 1363 (1975). 
3. The Flood Control Amendment to § 63-30-3 Fails to Pass 
the Malan Standard. 
Finally, the City argues that the flood control amendment to 
§ 63-30-3 does not deny equal protection under article I, § 24. 
The City hypothesizes that a rational distinction exists between 
long-term flood control and other municipal improvements on the 
ground that cities cannot budget for construction of flood 
control improvements the way they can for other public 
improvements. Accordingly, the City argues, the classification 
reasonably furthers the statute by protecting monies in the state 
disaster relief fund as well as treasuries of municipalities 
engaged in flood control measures. 
The foregoing analysis is purely a rational basis analysis, 
in that it accepts any conceivable rational basis for the 
classification. It fails to conduct a "real and thoughtful 
examination" of (a) the reasonableness of the classification and 
(b) whether the classification in fact reasonably and 
substantially furthers the legislative purpose of the statute. 
It also fails to take into account (c) the degree to which the 
statute unreasonably burdens constitutional rights. 
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(a) Reasonableness of the Classification. The 
reasonableness of a statutory classification cannot be judged in 
isolation, but rather must be judged in the context of the 
statutory pattern of which the classification is a part. Malan 
v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 671 (Utah 1984); Jenkins v. State, 85 
Wash. 2d 883, 540 P.2d 1363, 1368 (1975). 
Section 63-30-3 is part of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act, which is a comprehensive statutory scheme defining the scope 
of governmental immunity. Immunity is retained for injuries 
resulting from the exercise of a "governmental function," except 
as specifically waived. One such waiver is found in § 63-30-9, 
which waives immunity for "any injury caused from a dangerous or 
defective condition of any ... public improvement." The term 
"public improvement" encompasses water management systems such as 
dams, reservoirs, canals, and sewer drains. § 63-30-9 (dams and 
reservoirs); Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 P.2d 1086, 1088 
(Utah 1975) (canals and sewer drains). The waiver extends not 
only to damages resulting from defective conditions in completed 
improvement, but also to damages resulting from the construction 
of such improvements. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., supra; 
Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975). 
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that if paragraph two 
of § 63-30-3 is interpreted as creating absolute immunity for 
construction of "flood and storm systems," such an interpretation 
results in the unequal treatment of similarly situated persons. 
Such an interpretation would deny a person injured by the 
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construction of a flood control system the right to sue, while at 
the same time granting this right to a person injured by a water 
management system that is not "flood control." 
There is no reasonable basis for treating construction of 
flood control systems any differently than the construction of 
dams, reservoirs, canals, sewer drains, and other water 
management systems. Both types of systems serve essentially the 
same purpose of channelling and draining water. As a practical 
matter, the only difference between the two is that the former is 
labeled "flood" control (rather than water management) or is 
built with flood control funds rather than ordinary public 
improvement funds. That is not a sufficient basis, however, to 
deny one person the right to sue while allowing a similarly 
situated person that same right. 
The City argues that a rational distinction exists between 
the two types of improvement. Without any support, the City 
hypothesizes that cities are unable to include flood control 
construction as part of their normal operating budget the way 
they can budget other types of construction. 
The City's hypothesis, however, lacks any substantial basis. 
By statute cities are empowered to construct and regulate water 
management systems, including conduits, drains, streams, canals, 
ditches, storm sewers, and watercourses. See U.C.A., 1953, §§ 
10-8-13, -15, -16, & -38. Certainly cities can and often do 
budget for such construction as part of their normal operating 
budget. Thus, if a city wished to include one of the foregoing 
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systems in its budget as a "flood control" measure, it could do 
so. 
It is true that, in the instant case, the City paid for the 
improvement out of county flood control funds. That does not 
prove that the City could not have budgeted and paid for the 
improvement out of its own funds. Rather, it indicates that the 
City preferred not to use its own funds where county funds were 
available. The mere fact that the City desired to conserve its 
own funds does not provide, however, a reasonable basis for 
denying Farmers the right to sue, in light of the right granted 
to similarly situated persons. 
A second reason why the classification in this case is 
unreasonable is because the flood control amendment attempts to 
transform a non-governmental function into a governmental 
function merely by defining it as such. As originally enacted, 
the Governmental Immunity Act had twin goals. One goal was to 
reaffirm sovereign immunity for the exercise of "governmental 
functions" so that essential, core government activities would 
not be threatened by overwhelming losses to the public treasury 
caused by huge lawsuits. Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 
P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980). The other goal was to broaden the extent 
of government tort liability by impliedly waiving immunity for 
all "non-governmental function," so that "more innocent victims 
injured by tortious conduct on the part of public entities [would 
be allowed] access to the courts for redress." Id. at 1237. 
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In light of these twin goals, it is arbitrary and 
unreasonable for the Legislature to define an activity as a 
"governmental function" unless it truly is one. Without 
reasonable limitations, the Legislature could reinstitute 
immunity for any type of non-governmental function by simply 
passing legislation that arbitrarily labels it as a "governmental 
function." The construction, maintenance and operation of golf 
courses, swimming pools, recreational facilities, and sewers 
would all once again be "governmental functions." This would 
destroy the whole scheme behind the Act, as well as undo this 
Court's painstaking efforts to define the term "governmental 
function." 
For both of the above reasons, the classification created by 
§ 63-30-3 is unreasonable. 
(b) Whether the Classification in Fact Reasonably and 
Substantially Furthers the Legislative Purpose of the Statute. 
In Branam v. Provo School District, 117 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (1989), 
this Court recently discussed the legislative intent behind the 
paragraph two of § 63-30-3. The Court stated that it was not the 
legislature's intent to "immunize any entity entitled to the 
label 'governmental' from anything it might do in any capacity 
with what could be termed 'flood waters'": 
Rather, the legislation was concerned about potential 
liability from police power measures taken to protect 
public and private property from natural disasters such 
as the heavy flooding that occurred in many locations 
in Utah in 1983. [117 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8, emphasis 
added.] 
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By using the words "police power" to explain the intent 
behind § 63-30-3, para. 2, Branam provides an important insight 
into the objective of the statute. One of the state's essential 
police power functions, which is rightly to be protected, is its 
power to respond to emergencies. Such police power functions 
include not only responding to flood emergencies, but also to 
fires, mob violence, lawlessness, etc. In order to properly 
carry out such activities, the state and its subdivisions need 
the freedom to act quickly and decisively, unhampered by the fear 
of possible lawsuits, since failure to act could cause serious 
loss of life and property. Branam indicates that it was the 
purpose of § 63-30-3, para. 2, to protect such emergency flood 
control activities. 
In contrast, the construction of long-term flood control 
systems when no emergency is threatening cannot be an exercise of 
police power. ff[I]n the absence of any compelling emergency or 
the pressure of public necessity, the courts will be slow to 
invoke the doctrine of police power . . . where damage to private 
parties can be averted by proper construction and proper 
precautions in the first place." Ward v. Concrete Products Co. 
v. L.A. County Flood Control District 149 Cal. App.2d 840, 309 
P.2d 546 (1957). See also Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 
P.2d 505, 516 (1942); Jordan v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 15 Utah 
449, 49 P. 746 (1897); Short v. Pierce County, 78 P.2d 610 (Wash. 
1938). The difference between the two is like the difference 
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between fighting a fire versus building a fire station. The 
former is an exercise of police power, while the latter is not. 
Thus, insofar as § 63-30-3 gives absolute immunity to non-
emergency flood control construction, the classification does not 
in fact reasonably and substantially further the statutory 
objective, but is overinclusive. It goes beyond granting 
immunity for a police-power, essential governmental function 
(emergency flood control), and unnecessarily grants immunity for 
a non-police power, non-governmental function (non-emergency 
flood control construction). This additional immunity 
unnecessarily burdens plaintiff's constitutional rights to a 
remedy under article I, § 11. 
The City argues that the objective of the statute is to 
protect monies in the state disaster relief fund and municipal 
treasuries so that flood control measures can be carried out. 
(Respondent's brief at 17.) The protection of the treasury, 
however, is not an end in itself; the treasury should only be 
protected to the extent that "essential functions of government 
will not be imperiled." See Condemarin v. University Hospital, 
775 P.2d 348, 372 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J. separate concurring 
opinion). If protecting the treasury were the ultimate goal, 
then the Governmental Immunity Act would not have waived 
liability for non-governmental functions. Thus, even under the 
City's own analysis, granting immunity for non-emergency flood 
control construction does not further the statutory objective. 
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(c) The Degree to Which the Statute Unreasonably Burdens 
Constitutional Rights, Finally, the determination of 
reasonableness must take into account the degree to which 
constitutional rights are diminished. An absolute-immunity 
interpretation of § 63-30-3, para. 2, gives cities a license to 
needlessly damage persons' property in the name of "flood 
control," even though with proper planning and precaution such 
damage could be prevented. Arguable, a city could call any 
ditch, canal, or water course improvement a "flood control" 
measure, and thereby escape liability where otherwise it would be 
liable. Allowing cities to do so would "mercilessly and 
senselessly" bar victims of municipal negligence from recovering 
for injuries sustained at the hands of entities designed to serve 
them. See Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 
1237 (Utah 1980). Such a result completely ignores the objective 
of the Governmental Immunity Act to extend government tort 
liability in cases where only non-essential governmental 
functions are involved. 
In conclusion, an absolute-immunity interpretation of § 63-
30-3 goes far beyond what is required to ensure that government 
can respond to flood emergencies. Such an interpretation 
violates article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution by treating 
similarly situated persons differently. 
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Point II: Article I, § 22 Is a Constitutional Waiver of Immunity 
That Extends to Non-Intentional Damages 
A. Article I, § 22 Is a Constitutional Waiver of Immunity 
In its appellant's brief, Farmers argued that this Court 
should overrule Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 354 P. 2d at 105 
(Utah 1960) and its progeny. The City does not dispute any of 
the arguments made by Farmers for overruling Fairclough, nor does 
the City make any substantive arguments for retaining the rule in 
Fairclough. The only argument made by the City to avoid 
overruling Fairclough is a purely technical one, namely, that the 
legislature obviated the need to overrule Fairclough by passing § 
63-30-10.5, which waives sovereign immunity for takings or 
damagings without just compensation. 
It is difficult to see how the passage of § 63-30-10.5 
obviates the need to overrule Fairclough. Regardless of any 
statutory waiver of immunity for inverse condemnation suits, 
Farmers has a constitutional right under article I, § 22 to bring 
suit. Since that right exists independent of the statute, 
Fairclough must be overruled. 
Furthermore, the waiver made by § 63-30-10.5 is not 
sufficiently broad to substitute for the constitutional right 
under article I, § 22. By its express terms, § 63-30-10.5 limits 
compensation to the requirements of Chapter 34, Title 78, which 
governs eminent domain proceedings. The standards set forth in 
that chapter are only designed to allow compensation for damages 
that can be anticipated before construction begins. Such 
standards are clearly insufficient to cover inverse condemnation 
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suits, which typically seek compensation for damages that could 
not be anticipated before construction, 
B. Article I, § 22 Extends to Non-Intentional Damages 
The City next argues that article I, § 22 does not extend to 
non-intentional damages. In so arguing, however, the City does 
not address any of Farmers' arguments in support of a rule 
allowing compensation for non-intentional damages. Rather, the 
City relies solely on Lund v. Salt Lake County, 200 P. 510 (Utah 
1921), to support its position. 
Lund should be either distinguished or overruled. The 
reasons for distinguishing Lund are stated in Farmer's 
appellant's brief and need not be repeated here. The reasons for 
overruling Lund are worthy of some elaboration. A rule requiring 
intent unreasonably restricts the scope of article I, § 22 to 
only a small percentage of the cases that article I, § 22 was 
intended to cover, "for prior to the construction of the 
improvement which causes the injury it may not be apparent that 
damage will result." Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 
(1942). Moreover, the rule applied by Lund is unsupported by the 
reasoning of Lund itself and by the better-reasoned modern cases. 
The only context in which Lund makes sense would be in an eminent 
domain proceeding, held before construction begins, in which a 
determination will be made of the necessary damages for which 
advance compensation should be given. 
The City argues that the Lund rule is consistent with the 
language of article I, § 22, which states that that property must 
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be damaged "for" public use. The City asserts that the public 
must benefit from the damage caused if it is to be "for" public 
use; otherwise, the damage is merely "by" public use, and thus 
outside the scope of article I, § 22. 
The City's construction of the "damaged for public use" 
clause is nonsensical. Obviously, where damage results from the 
construction of a public improvement, the benefit to the public 
can only be the improvement, not the damage. The only reasonable 
interpretation of "damaged for public use," in the context of 
public improvements, is that the damage was caused by the 
construction of the improvement. Thus, this Court has stated, 
"Consequential damages to property which are caused by making 
public improvements are recoverable under [article I, §22]." 
Coalter v. Salt Lake City, 120 P. 851, 853 (Utah 1912) (emphasis 
added.) Accord Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 2, § 6.22 at 6-
159, and Vol. 2A, § 6.30 (3rd. ed 1985 & 1987). 
The late Justice Traynor explained this rule as follows: 
The destruction or damaging of property is 
sufficiently connected with "public use," as 
required by the [California] Constitution, if 
the injury is a result of dangers inherent in 
the construction of the public improvement as 
distinguished from dangers arising from the 
negligent operation of the improvement. The 
construction of the public improvement is a 
deliberate action of the state or its agency 
in furtherance of public purposes. ... The 
decisive consideration is the effect of the 
public improvement on the property and 
whether the owner of the damaged property if 
uncompensated would contribute more than his 
proper share to the public undertaking. It 
is irrelevant whether or not the injury to 
the property is accompanied by a 
corresponding benefit to the public purpose 
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to which the improvement is dedicated, since 
the measure of liability is not the benefit 
derived from the property, but the loss to 
the owner. 
House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control District, 25 Cal. 2d 
384, 153 P.2d 950, 955-56 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
The City also argues that the Lund rule is consistent with 
U.C.A., 1953, § 63-30-10.5, which limits compensation for damages 
to the standards for eminent domain proceedings. See § 78-34-
10(3) (damages that "will" be caused by construction). This 
argument merely highlights the fact that § 63-30-10.5, as 
presently enacted, is not sufficiently broad to cover inverse 
condemnation cases, since § 63-30-10.5 is restricted to eminent 
domain standards. 
In summary, the Lund rule should be distinguished or 
overruled. The "damaged for public use" language of article I, § 
22 in no way supports a retention of the Lund rule. 
Point III: Taking May Occur When a Physical Invasion Results 
in Loss of Use 
The City argues that there was no "taking" in this case 
because economic impact alone cannot rise to the level of taking. 
It asserts that Farmers has merely asserted a "negative economic 
impact on plaintiff's investment in the mall property." In so 
doing, the City mischaracterizes the "essentially ad hoc" factual 
inquiry essential to a determination of a taking. See Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 
(1978). 
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In Penn Central, the Supreme Court lamented the lack of 
clear guidelines to determine a "taking." After a protracted 
analysis of takings cases, it asserted that two primary 
considerations should be applied before dismissing a "taking" 
claim: (1) the character of the state action; and (2) the nature 
and extent of the interference. The economic impact of the 
"taking" is a relevant consideration, and may be dispositive 
where state action interferes with interests that are 
sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expectations of the 
claimant. Penn Central at 125. The Court further determined 
that where the present use of the land was affected, a "taking" 
occurs. Id. at 128. The Court concluded that no taking had 
occurred because the present use of the building had not been 
impaired and Penn Central could still realize a reasonable return 
on its investment. 
In this case the damage caused by the City rendered portions 
of the Mall uninhabitable, and thus destroyed the mall's present 
use and any reasonable expectation of a return on Farmers1 
investment. Farmers cannot use the mall without first repairing 
the damage. Thus, the City deprived Farmers of both the present 
use of the full mall and any reasonable expectation of investment 
return. 
This "economic impact" springs directly from the City's 
actual, physical damage to the mall. This is not a case where a 
taking results from the mere diminution in property value 
standing alone. See Penn Central at 131. Rather, Farmers has 
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been denied the present use of the property and any resulting 
economic benefit because of the City's action. Farmers should be 
compensated for its loss. 
Point IV: The Easement Granted by Farmers Created a Contract 
Between Farmers and Bountiful City, and thus the City 
Is Estopped from Asserting Sovereign Immunity 
The City next argues that the trial court correctly ruled 
there was no implied contract between the City and Farmers 
because an easement is a mere grant that creates no duties from 
the grantee to the grantor. Furthermore, the City argues, it did 
not even sign the instrument granting the easement. 
Although an easement takes the form of a grant, it 
nonetheless creates obligations between the grantor and the 
grantee just as comprehensive as those between a covenantor and a 
covenantee. Hottell v. Farmers1 Protective Assoc, 53 P. 327, 
329 (Colo. 1898). Included in these obligations is the duty of 
the grantee to "exercise his rights so as not unreasonably to 
interfere with the [grantor's rights]." Big Cottonwood Tanner 
Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148, 158 (Utah 1946). 
By virtue of such covenants, the parties to the easement 
enter into an implied contract. The term "covenant" means to 
enter into an agreement or "bind oneself to a contract." Beall 
v. Hardie, 177 Kan. 353, 279 P.2d 276 (1955). The grantee's 
signature is not required to create such a contract, so long as 
the grantee accepts the delivered conveyance. Bracklein v. 
Realty Insurance Co., 80 P.2d 471, 477 (Utah 1948). In this case 
the City accepted delivery of the instrument granting the 
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easement, and by so doing manifested its assent to the contract 
implied in such a grant. 
The City could not have built the culvert in this case 
without either getting Farmersf consent "or instituting an eminent 
domain proceeding. In giving its consent, Farmers relied on the 
implied covenant that the City's use of the easement would be 
reasonable, including giving reasonable lateral support. Farmers 
would never have given its consent had it known that the City 
would damage Farmers' mall. 
CONCLUSION 
It would be indeed ironic if, in its efforts to guard 
against future flooding, a city could carelessly harm with 
impunity the very persons it is supposed to protect. This Court 
should refuse to allow such an injustice by granting Farmers the 
relief it requests. 
DATED this 31st day of October, 1989. 
James L. Chiristensen 
Paul D. Newton 
Mark J. Morrise 
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PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAILING 
The undersigned, attorney for plaintiff and appellant 
Farmers New World Life Insurance Co., hereby certifies that on 
the 31st day of October, 1989, he caused the foregoing 
"Appellant's Reply Brief" to be served on all parties to this 
appeal, by mailing copies thereof by first-class mail, postage 
prepaid, on the following: 
Attorneys for Bountiful City 
Allan L. Larson 
Stanley J. Preston 
Robert C. Keller 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dated: Cct 3f K¥<jf \\o^ls ,v< 
James L. C h r i s t e n s e n 
Paul D. Newton 
Mark J . Morr i se 
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